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PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC
RECORDS ACT: THE CASE FOR AGENCY DISCRETION
William D. Richard
Abstract: Voters adopted Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) in 1972 as part of a
broader ballot measure to enhance openness in state government. The PRA requires state
government agencies, including statewide agencies and municipalities, to establish
procedures so that the public can request copies of records agencies generate. The PRA
exempts certain records from disclosure, and other statutes and case law supply additional
exemptions. When an agency refuses to disclose records, the requester may ask a court to
determine whether an exemption applies. If no exemption applies, the court may compel
disclosure of the records and impose monetary penalties against the non-compliant agency,
including attorney fees. Under the PRA, courts review denials de novo and in light of
legislative intent, erring on the side of broad public access. In addition to reviewing denials,
courts have recently been asked to consider whether an agency’s procedural rules under the
PRA are reasonable. In analyzing procedural rules, some courts have applied the same broad
interpretation used for substantive PRA questions, refusing to presume that an agency’s
procedural regulations are valid despite administrative law and municipal law doctrines
requiring such a presumption. As a result, courts have imposed heavy penalties on public
agencies at great taxpayer expense. This Comment argues that courts should presume an
agency’s procedural rules adopted for purposes of the PRA are valid as long as they are
consistent with the statute’s mandate.

INTRODUCTION
Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA)1 is a “strongly worded
mandate for broad disclosure of public records.”2 Adopted in 1972,3 the
PRA gives interested members of the public the opportunity to access
documents reflecting the inner workings of state and municipal agencies.

1. In this Comment, “Public Records Act” and “PRA” refer to the legislation currently found at
title 42, chapter 56 of the Revised Code of Washington. As discussed infra, what is now the PRA
was adopted as part of a broader public-disclosure statute. See Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1,
§§ 25–34, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 21–25 (1972). The PRA, along with the rest of this larger
statute, was initially codified at title 42, chapter 17 of the Revised Code of Washington. In 2005, the
Legislature transferred the public-records legislation to a new chapter, renumbered the sections, and
restyled them as the Public Records Act. See Act of May 4, 2005, ch. 274, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws
893. Opinions and other court documents predating the re-codification on July 1, 2006, id. § 502,
1992 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1031, frequently refer to the old numbering scheme. Throughout this
Comment, where a source referred to the old numbering scheme, the reference has been altered to
reflect the new numbering scheme.
2. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978).
3. Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 31 (1972).
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The PRA requires agencies to make certain records available for
inspection and copying, subject to limitations in the PRA itself and rules
adopted by the agencies themselves.4 When an agency denies access to a
record based on one of the PRA’s disclosure exemptions, the requester
may seek judicial review of that decision.5 In reviewing agency denials,
courts have generally been mindful of the Washington Legislature’s
declared intent to ensure broad access to public records.6 As a result,
courts construe the PRA’s disclosure provisions broadly and its
exemptions narrowly.
Historically, courts focused primarily on interpreting the PRA’s
disclosure and exemption provisions.7 Only recently have litigants asked
courts to consider the reasonableness of agency procedural rules and
policies adopted to protect agency functions.8 Faced with difficult facts
and lacking clear guidance, state courts have taken different approaches
to interpreting agency rules. As a result, some courts have imposed large
awards against agencies, including attorney fees and daily statutory
penalties. Taxpayers, in turn, ultimately pay these penalties through
increased burdens on agency budgets.9
This Comment argues that, unlike the courts’ approach to interpreting
the substantive disclosure and exemption provisions of the PRA, courts
should defer to an agency’s own determination that its PRA procedures
are reasonable. Part I discusses the PRA’s history and relevant operative
provisions. Part II examines the statutory mandate the PRA imposes on
agencies, including a duty to adopt procedural rules as well as the duty
to disclose records. Part III looks at agency procedural rules under the
PRA in the broader context of administrative and municipal law. Part IV
examines Washington courts’ contradictory approaches to interpreting
agencies’ procedural rules under state administrative procedure law. Part
V argues that, although the voters and the Legislature created a broad
mandate for disclosure of public records, the breadth of that mandate
should not overcome the rule of judicial deference to an agency’s
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008) (establishing duty to make records available); id.
§ 42.56.100 (requiring agencies to adopt procedures for providing public access to public records).
5. Id. § 42.56.550.
6. See Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008) (citing
Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d 439, 450, 90 P.3d 26, 31 (2004)); Progressive Animal
Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994). See generally
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008) (requiring disclosure provisions to be construed broadly and
exemptions to be construed narrowly).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
9. See examples infra Part IV.C.
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interpretation of its own procedural rules. Courts should presume that
such rules are valid for purposes of the PRA because doing so avoids
serious pragmatic problems without violating legislative intent.
I.

THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT IS A STRONGLY WORDED
MANDATE FOR BROAD DISCLOSURE OF PUBLIC
RECORDS

In 1972, Washington voters approved what is now the Public Records
Act10 as part of a sweeping measure designed to minimize secrecy and
expose corruption in state government.11 The PRA created a procedural
and substantive regime under which, with a few limited exemptions,
government documents are subject to disclosure upon request.12 The
PRA allows both state and local agencies to establish procedures for
members of the public to obtain government records.13
A.

Voters Adopted the Public Records Act as Part of an Open
Government Measure

Initiative 276 (I-276) was put to Washington voters on the November
1972 general election ballot.14 The bulk of I-276 dealt with campaign
finance disclosures.15 It established a public disclosure commission,16
required political candidates to disclose the source and amounts of all
campaign contributions,17 compelled lobbyists to register with the state
government,18 and obligated government officials to disclose certain
financial interests.19

10. See supra note 1.
11. See Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, § 1, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 1–2 (1972).
12. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070 (2008) (establishing duty to make records available); id.
§ 42.56.100 (requiring agencies to establish procedures).
13. See id. § 42.56.070 (establishing duty to make records available); id. § 42.56.100 (requiring
agencies to establish procedures).
14. Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 31 (1972).
15. Id. §§ 3–14, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 5–12 (requiring disclosure of campaign contributions);
§§ 15–23, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 12–18 (requiring registration of lobbyists and barring lobbyists
from certain activities); § 24, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 18–20 (requiring elected officials and
family members to disclose financial transactions).
16. Id. §§ 35–37, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 25–27.
17. Id. § 8, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 7–9.
18. Id. § 15, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 12–13.
19. Id. § 24, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 18–20.
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The initiative also required the state to provide public access to
government records.20 In the state’s official 1972 voters’ pamphlet, the
initiative’s proponents stated that the public records provisions would
make “all public records and documents in state and local agencies
available for public inspection and copying,” with exceptions “to protect
individual privacy and safeguard essential governmental functions.”21
The initiative’s opponents, however, went into more detail:
[Initiative] 276 doesn’t tell the taxpayer about added cost of
government. Virtually every office of State and Local
Government will incur added expenses—staff, office space,
files, supplies and computer time—at a conservatively estimated
cost of more than $2 million dollars [sic] annually. . . . It is
impossible to estimate the potential cost to State, County and
City Government of making all public records available for
inspection and copying.22
In addition to I-276, the Legislature placed two competing public
disclosure measures on the same ballot;23 however, I-276 superseded
both of them24 and passed with seventy-two percent of the vote,25 taking
effect on January 1, 1973.26
B.

The Public Records Act Prescribes Both Substantive and
Procedural Rules for Access to Government Records

The PRA applies to most government agencies at the state, regional,
county, and city levels.27 Several of its provisions also apply to clerks of
the legislative houses.28 The clerks maintain “public records” subject to

20. Id. §§ 25–32, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 21–25 (requiring agencies to make public records
available for inspection and copying).
21. WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET (GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY,
NOVEMBER 7, 1972) 10 (1972) [hereinafter VOTERS PAMPHLET].
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 66–69 (Referendum Bill 24, regulating lobbying activities); id. at 69–74 (Referendum
Bill 25, regulating campaign-finance activities and requiring candidates for office and groups
supporting and opposing ballot measures to disclose financial information).
24. Initiative Measure No. 276 § 50, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 30–31 (repealing both
Referendum Bill 24 and Referendum Bill 25).
25. See Wash. Sec’y of State, Initiatives to the People – 1914 through 2009, http://www.sos.
wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics_initiatives.aspx (last visited May 31, 2010). The November
1972 general-election ballot had the most measures of any statewide ballot up to that time. See
VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 21, at 3 (“an all time record”).
26. Initiative Measure No. 276 § 49, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 30.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008).
28. E.g., id. § 42.56.010(2) (incorporating certain legislative records and administrative records
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the PRA,29 but the Legislature has authority to regulate access to records
to prevent interference with legislative business.30 Certain nongovernmental entities are subject to the PRA if they are “functional
equivalents” of government agencies, as often occurs in the case of
outsourcing.31 The PRA does not apply to courts.32
The PRA requires agencies to disclose any “writing” relating to the
conduct of government or the performance of any government function,
whether proprietary or explicitly governmental.33 The PRA also applies
to certain legislative records.34 The term “writing” encompasses every
method of recording communications or representations.35 If the
disclosure of a record would violate a person’s right to privacy, that
record is exempt from disclosure.36
Agencies must follow certain procedures set by the PRA regarding
public-disclosure requests. Agencies are required, for example, to make
their public records available during customary office hours.37 Each
agency must also designate a public records officer to serve as a point of
contact38 and publish indexes for certain documents, such as adjudicative
opinions and correspondence relating to policy matters.39 Agencies are
generated by the Legislature within the definition of “public records”); id. § 42.56.070(9) (limiting
the powers of the Secretary and the Chief Clerk to sell records for commercial purposes); id.
§ 42.56.090 (requiring the Secretary and the Chief Clerk, along with state and local agencies, to post
hours for access to records on their web sites); id. § 42.56.100 (requiring the Secretary and the Chief
Clerk to adopt access procedures consistent with the resource limitations associated with legislative
sessions).
29. See id. § 42.56.010(2); id. § 40.14.100 (defining “legislative records” as “public records”
subject to the PRA).
30. Id. § 42.56.100 (permitting Secretary and Chief Clerk to adopt rules and regulations
governing access to records, allowing for time, resource, and personnel constraints associated with
legislative sessions).
31. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 191–92, 181
P.3d 881, 884–85 (2008) (citing Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149,
162, 974 P.2d 886, 893–94 (1999)).
32. City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 345–46, 217 P.3d 1172, 1173–74 (2009)
(holding that courts are not included in the PRA’s definition of “agency”).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008) (establishing duty to make public records available
for inspection and copying); id. § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public record”).
34. Id. § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public record” as including certain records maintained by the
Legislature).
35. Id. § 42.56.010(3) (defining “writing,” which includes “pictures and sounds, and the means by
which they may be recorded, such as audio or video recording and magnetic or optical media”).
36. See id. §§ 42.56.210–.480 (listing statutory exemptions).
37. Id. § 42.56.090. Regardless of the agency’s customary hours, however, records must be
available for inspection at least thirty hours per week. Id.
38. Id. § 42.56.580(1).
39. Id. § 42.56.070(3). But see id. § 42.56.070(4) (excusing agencies from this requirement where
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also required to make their copying facilities available to members of the
public for copying records.40
II.

THE PRA REQUIRES AGENCIES TO DISCLOSE RECORDS
PROMPTLY UNDER PROCEDURAL RULES
PROMULGATED BY THE AGENCY

In addition to the procedural rules defined in the PRA itself, agencies
also adopt their own PRA procedural rules and regulations to ensure
prompt compliance with the disclosure requirements while protecting
records and limiting interference with other agency functions.41 Once an
agency receives a public-disclosure request, it has a duty to respond
promptly, either by providing the record, denying access to it, or
providing a reasonable estimate of the time required to fill the request.42
If the agency denies access to the records, the requester may seek de
novo review in superior court.43 If the requester prevails in court, he or
she is entitled to recover attorney fees, court costs, and per diem
statutory penalties assessed against the agency.44
A.

Agencies Adopt Procedural PRA Rules Consistent with the PRA’s
Mandate

In addition to the procedural limits spelled out in the PRA, agencies
may adopt procedural rules to prevent records requests from interfering
excessively with other essential agency functions.45 Additionally,
agencies must establish rules and regulations to protect public records
from damage or disorganization.46 Agency rules must be “consonant
with the intent of [the PRA] to provide full public access to public
records,” and must “provide for the fullest assistance to inquirers and the
most timely possible action on requests for information.”47 All
procedural rules established under the PRA must be reasonable.48
In 2005, the Legislature directed the Attorney General of Washington
it is unduly burdensome).
40. Id. § 42.56.080.
41. Id. § 42.56.100.
42. Id. § 42.56.520.
43. Id. § 42.56.550.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 42.56.100.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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to produce a model code for state and local agencies and to adopt a set of
“best practices” for agency compliance with the PRA.49 The model rules
offer some guidance for agencies in structuring their internal
organization, public records storage, and disclosure systems.50 Portions
of the model rules have fill-in-the-blank provisions that agencies can
adopt as their own.51 No court has yet considered whether these model
rules meet the PRA’s reasonableness requirement.
State agencies are required to publish their procedural rules in the
Washington Administrative Code.52 Local agencies must prominently
display their procedural rules and make them available for inspection
and copying.53 Where the PRA requires regulations or requirements to
be published or displayed and the agency fails to do so, requesters
cannot be required to follow any such procedural rule.54 Where the PRA
and another statute conflict, the PRA prevails.55
B.

Agencies Must Answer Disclosure Requests Promptly

Agencies must respond to public-disclosure requests “promptly.”56
Within five business days, the agency must provide the requested
records, deny the request, or provide a “reasonable” estimate of the time
needed to fill the request.57 The agency may announce that it needs more
time if it needs to clarify which records were requested, locate and
assemble the requested records, notify third persons whose interests may
be affected,58 or determine whether a disclosure exemption applies.59

49. Act of May 16, 2005, ch. 483, § 4, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 2043, 2045 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.56.570 (2008)) (relating to public disclosure).
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 44-14-00001 to -04004 (2009).
51. E.g., id. § 44-14-020 (providing space for agency description, contact information, and
designation of public-records officer).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.040(1) (2008).
53. Id. No cases have interpreted the “prominent display” language of the PRA; it is unclear
whether this would include publication in a municipal code, posting on a website, or something else
altogether. Because the parallel provision for state agencies allows for publication in the
Washington Administrative Code, which necessarily invokes the rule-making provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, publication in a similar code volume by a local agency may be a
sufficiently prominent display. See id. §§ 34.05.310–.395.
54. Id. § 42.56.040(2).
55. Id. § 42.56.030 (“In the event of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and any other
act, the provisions of this chapter shall govern.”).
56. Id. § 42.56.520.
57. Id.
58. Id. Such third persons may then seek an injunction against disclosure. Id. § 42.56.540.
59. Id. § 42.56.520.
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If an agency denies access to records, a written explanation must
accompany the denial.60 The denial statement must be “specific.”61
Generally, it must cite the specific provisions of law that make the
document exempt.62 Once the agency denies the request, it must provide
for a prompt review of the denial.63 Even if the agency does not provide
review, a denial is considered final after two business days.64
C.

Requesters Whose Public-Records Requests Are Denied May Seek
Judicial Review

If an agency denies a public-records request, the requester may take
further steps that depend upon whether the agency is a state or a local
entity. Requesters of both state and local agency records may seek
judicial review in superior court within one year of the denial.65 People
seeking records from state agencies may also ask the Attorney General
for an opinion as to whether the requested record is exempt.66
The PRA allows judicial review in either of two situations: where an
agency has denied a request for records,67 or where a requester believes
that an agency’s estimate of the time required to fill a records request is
unreasonably long.68 Courts review agency actions de novo,69 and
requesters may seek relief in the county in which the agency maintains
the record or, where the agency is a county, in certain neighboring
counties.70 In a judicial-review proceeding, the agency has the burden of
proving that an exemption applies or that the agency cannot disclose the
record by law.71
The judicial-review provision applies to any situation in which an
agency has “denied [a requester] an opportunity to inspect or copy a
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 270, 884 P.2d 592,
607 (1994).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.520 (2008).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 42.56.550.
66. Id. § 42.56.530.
67. Id. § 42.56.550(1).
68. Id. § 42.56.550(2).
69. Id. § 42.56.550(3).
70. Id. § 42.56.550(1)–(2); id. § 42.56.550(5) (citing id. § 36.01.050 (allowing suits against
counties to be commenced either in the superior court of the county or in the superior courts of the
two nearest judicial districts)).
71. Id. § 42.56.550(1)–(2).
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public record.”72 Thus, it applies even where an agency has not explicitly
denied a request; failing to provide a record within the statutory period is
considered a de facto denial.73 The judicial-review provision does not
specifically address the situation where a requester has been “denied an
opportunity to inspect or copy a public record” as a result of the
requester’s failure to comply with a duly posted agency rule.74
When a requester prevails on judicial review, that person is entitled to
a monetary award.75 The award must include all costs incurred in
connection with bringing the action, including reasonable attorney
fees.76 The court is also required to award to a prevailing requester a
penalty of between $5 and $100 for each day that records were
withheld.77 The penalty award is mandatory, even without evidence of
bad faith or unreasonable conduct,78 but the per diem amount of the
award falls within the superior court’s discretion.79
III. EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND MUNICIPAL LAW
REQUIRES COURTS TO DEFER TO AGENCY RULES AND
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
State agencies adopt PRA procedures under Washington’s
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),80 while local agencies adopt them

72. Id. § 42.56.550(1).
73. Id. § 42.56.520; Doe I v. Wash. State Patrol, 80 Wash. App. 296, 303, 908 P.2d 914, 918
(1996) (holding that the state patrol’s failure to reply to request within the statutory period was a
denial of the request de facto).
74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550 (2008).
75. Id. § 42.56.550(4).
76. Id. Attorney fees are calculated on a lodestar basis. West v. Port of Olympia, 146 Wash. App.
108, 122, 192 P.3d 926, 933 (2008) (citing Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 433, 957 P.2d 632,
651 (1998) (providing that computation of attorney fees is by “lodestar method” of multiplying the
reasonable number of hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate)).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2008). Before 1992, the amount was between zero and
$25 per day, and the decision of whether or not to assess a penalty was within the sound discretion
of the superior court. See Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 64 Wash. App. 295, 299, 825 P.2d 324,
327 (1992).
78. Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 36, 929 P.2d 389, 395 (1997) (stating that
requester need not show bad faith in order to recover statutory penalty).
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2008); see Citizens for Fair Share v. State Dep’t of Corr.,
117 Wash. App. 411, 437, 72 P.3d 206, 220 (2003) (quoting Yousoufian v. Office of Sims, 114
Wash. App. 836, 847, 60 P.3d 667, 672 (2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 152 Wash. 2d 421,
98 P.3d 463 (2004)) (stating that appellate review of amount of costs and statutory penalties is for
abuse of discretion).
80. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.001–.903 (2008).
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under their charters and state law.81 Outside the PRA context, dulyadopted agency rules and ordinances are presumed valid by courts. This
presumption is based upon both statutory authority and a well-developed
body of case law relating to administrative agencies and municipalities.
A.

State Agencies Enact PRA Regulations Under the Administrative
Procedure Act

The APA prescribes the method by which state agencies adopt
regulations and adjudicate disputes within their respective mandates. Its
procedures apply equally to regulations implementing the PRA as they
do to the other regulations an agency adopts.82
Under the APA, state agencies adopt regulations through a noticeand-comment process.83 In the typical case, agencies publish proposed
rules in the Washington State Register.84 A proposed rule must include
the statutory authority for the rule; a short explanation of the rule; and
agency comments or recommendations regarding statutory provisions,
implementation, enforcement, and fiscal matters.85 The agency must then
give interested members of the public an opportunity to make comments
on the proposed regulation, including oral comments made during a
public hearing.86 The agency may adopt the rule only after considering
the public’s submitted comments.87 If the final rule varies substantially
from the proposed rule, the agency must either supplement its public
notice-and-comment process or start the rulemaking process anew.88
Much of the information the agency produces relating to the rulemaking

81. See id. § 34.05.220 (permitting state agencies to adopt procedural rules under the state’s
Administrative Procedure Act); WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (permitting municipalities to adopt
regulations not in conflict with general laws); see also Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. 2d 862,
870, 101 P.3d 67, 71 (2004) (citing 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 10:5 (Thomson West, 3d ed., rev. vol. 2006)).
82. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(16) (defining “rule” as “any agency order, directive, or
regulation of general applicability . . . (c) which establishes, alters, or revokes any qualification or
requirement relating to the enjoyment of benefits or privileges conferred by law”); see also id.
§ 42.56.040 (requiring state agencies to publish their rules of procedure in the Washington
Administrative Code); id. § 34.05.210 (requiring the Code Reviser to publish the Washington
Administrative Code, which must contain “[a]ll current, permanently effective rules of each
agency”).
83. See id. §§ 34.05.310–.395.
84. Id. § 34.05.320.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 34.05.325.
87. Id. § 34.05.335(2).
88. Id. § 34.05.340.
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process, including all public submissions, is included in a rulemaking
file that becomes part of the record upon which judicial review is
based.89
State agencies must promulgate their PRA procedural regulations in
accordance with the methods outlined in the APA.90 For example,
Western Washington University recently deleted its old PRA procedural
rules and adopted new ones conforming with the Attorney General’s
model rules.91 The University proposed the rule in the Washington
Register,92 ordered it adopted in a board-of-trustees meeting,93 and
published the final rule in the Washington Register.94 This was all done
in accordance with the trustees’ statutory authority,95 the PRA’s
mandate, and the APA’s procedural rules.96 The new PRA regulation
describes the University’s internal structure and designates a publicrecords officer,97 creates a procedure for inspecting and requesting
public records,98 and lists some statutory exemptions to disclosure
specified outside the PRA.99
B.

Municipal Entities Adopt PRA Ordinances in Accordance with
Their Charters or State Law

Like state agencies, local agencies adopt PRA procedural rules using
formal procedures. Municipalities—including counties, cities, and
towns—enact ordinances in connection with their charters or general
provisions in the Revised Code of Washington.100 PRA procedural rules

89. Id. § 34.05.370.
90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
91. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 516-09-010 to -080 (2009) (establishing university procedural
rules); id. §§ 44-14-00001 to -08004 (establishing Attorney General’s model rules).
92. 07-19 Wash. Reg. 115 (proposed Sept. 18, 2007).
93. Minutes of the Bd. of Trs. of W. Wash. Univ. at 4588–89 (Dec. 14, 2007), available at
http://content.wwu.edu/u?/BOTmin,4099; 08-01 Wash. Reg. 164, 164 (Dec. 18, 2007) (citing order
of adoption).
94. 08-01 Wash. Reg. 164 (Dec. 18, 2007) (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 516-09) (final
rule).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.35.120(12) (2008) (granting university trustees authority to
promulgate rules and regulations deemed necessary).
96. Id. § 42.56.100 (requiring agencies to adopt public-records rules and regulations).
97. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 516-09-020 (2009).
98. Id. § 516-09-030.
99. Id. § 516-09-060.
100. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.32.120(7) (2008) (granting county legislative authorities the
power to “make and enforce . . . all such police and sanitary regulations as are not in conflict with
state law”); id. § 36.01.010 (listing county corporate powers); id. § 36.32.005 (stating that county
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are adopted in the form of ordinances and resolutions and, therefore,
have the force of law.101
The Washington State Constitution grants municipalities the power to
adopt “police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws.”102 Commentators have noted, and case law has illustrated,
that municipalities exercise their powers in two distinct modes:
governmental and proprietary.103 Courts generally interpret proprietary
powers more liberally than governmental powers.104 Governmental
functions are “those conferred on a municipal corporation . . . to be
employed in administering the affairs of the state and promoting the
public welfare generally.”105 Proprietary powers, on the other hand, are
“those relating to the accomplishment of private corporate purposes in
which the public is only indirectly concerned.”106 PRA regulations might
fall into the latter category because they define how the municipality
will protect its records and prevent interference with its operations.107 On
the other hand, local agencies generate records as part of their
governmental functions to promote public welfare and administer the
affairs of the state. No Washington court has squarely addressed in
which category PRA regulations belong, and as a result the courts have

powers can only be carried out by county commissioners or officers acting with legal authority); id.
§ 35.22.020 (stating that first-class cities shall exercise their powers, functions, and duties in
accordance with their charters); id. § 35.23.010 (listing corporate powers of a second-class city); id.
§ 35.23.211 (specifying the requisites of a valid ordinance in a second-class city); id. § 35.27.370(1)
(empowering town councils to pass ordinances not in conflict with state or federal law); id.
§ 35.27.010 (listing town corporate powers); id. § 35A.11.020 (granting to the legislative body of a
code city the “power to organize and regulate its internal affairs within the provisions of this title
and its charter, if any”); id. § 35A.11.010 (listing corporate powers of code cities); see also WASH.
CONST. art. XI, § 11 (granting municipalities the power to make and enforce “police, sanitary, and
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws”).
101. See City of Tacoma v. Lillis, 4 Wash. 797, 802, 31 P. 321, 323 (1892) (“It may be stated as a
general legal proposition that valid ordinances have the force of laws, and are as binding upon the
inhabitants of a municipality as are the statutes of the state upon its citizens generally.”) (citing 1
JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 308 (4th ed.
1890); Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 409 (La. 1827))).
102. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
103. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495,
496 (2000). See generally 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 81 (collecting cases nationwide).
104. Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. 2d 862, 870, 101 P.3d 67, 71 (2004) (citing 2A
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:22, at 378 (Clark Boardman
Callaghan, 3d ed., rev. vol. 2, 1996)).
105. 2A MCQULLIN, supra note 81, at 391.
106. Id. at 392–93.
107. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.100 (2008) (requiring procedural rules to protect records and
ensure that providing records does not interfere with other agency functions).
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not specified whether a liberal construction of a municipal agency’s
powers under the PRA is appropriate.
Municipalities enact ordinances differently depending on whether the
municipality is a county, a city, or a town, and whether the municipality
has a charter or is governed by the generic provisions of the Revised
Code of Washington.108 For example, Snohomish County, which has its
own charter,109 adopted PRA regulations as ordinances.110 These
regulations designate a public-records officer, specify that the officer is
the primary point of contact for PRA requests, and give the officer the
power to adopt more detailed procedural rules.111 The regulations also
require departments to designate public-records specialists,112 allow
informal PRA requests under certain circumstances,113 and specify
procedures requesters may follow when their requests are denied.114
Other municipalities have PRA ordinances that direct city officials to
promulgate regulations to implement the PRA.115
C.

Regulations and Ordinances Are Entitled to a Presumption of
Validity, Even When They Are Subject to Review De Novo

Outside the PRA context, courts generally presume that state agency
regulations and municipal ordinances are valid.116 Washington courts
invalidate state agency regulations for only four reasons: the rule is
unconstitutional, exceeds the agency’s statutory authority, was adopted
outside of the statutory rule-making procedure, or is arbitrary and

108. See supra note 100.
109. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASH., AMENDED CHARTER (2007), available at http://www.co.
snohomish.wa.us/Documents/Departments/Council/county_code/CountyCharter.pdf.
110. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 2.51.010–.120 (2009), available at http://www.co.
snohomish.wa.us/Documents/Departments/Council/county_code/CountyCodeTitle2.pdf.
111. Id. § 2.51.035.
112. Id. § 2.51.040.
113. Id. § 2.51.060.
114. Id. § 2.51.080.
115. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 3.104.030 (1985) (requiring Seattle city agencies to
promulgate PRA-compliant procedures); BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE §§ 2.26.005–.080 (1994)
(authorizing the Bellevue city clerk to promulgate PRA-compliant regulations).
116. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 228, at 207 (2004) (explaining that courts presume
regulations are valid when adopted under a delegation of authority and in conformity with an
administrative procedure statute); 6 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 20:6, at 33 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2007) (explaining that courts presume municipal ordinances are valid;
“every intendment will be indulged” in favor of the validity of a municipal ordinance except where
the ordinance appears to be ultra vires).
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capricious.117 Washington courts presume that administrative rules
adopted in both substantive and procedural conformity with applicable
statutes are valid and will uphold them on judicial review as long as they
are reasonably consistent with the substantive statute being
implemented.118
Courts likewise presume that municipal ordinances are valid.119
Where local government agencies have discretion, courts should not
examine the methods by which the agencies exercise that discretion120
unless an agency’s actions are arbitrary or capricious.121 When local
governments carry out grants of power, courts construe those grants
liberally.122 While municipalities cannot act contrary to statutory or
constitutional provisions,123 municipalities are free to adopt regulations
within legislated limits.124 Thus, courts typically presume that agency
regulations and municipal ordinances—including PRA-implementing
regulations and ordinances—are valid.
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE TAKEN CONTRADICTORY
APPROACHES WHEN REVIEWING AGENCIES’
PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER THE PRA
The jurisprudence that has evolved around the PRA’s substantive
requirements reflects the Legislature’s stated intent that access to public
records should be as broad as possible.125 Recent cases have considered
the reasonableness of agency procedures, as distinct from the substantive
question of whether a given record is subject to disclosure.126 While the
Supreme Court of Washington has suggested through dicta that agencies
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(2)(c) (2008).
118. Campbell v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 150 Wash. 2d 881, 892, 83 P.3d 999,
1006 (2004).
119. Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wash. 2d 556, 561, 29 P.3d 709, 712 (2001).
120. Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, 86 Wash. App. 165, 178, 936 P.2d 1148,
1155 (1997) (citing Haga v. City of Seattle, 3 Wash. 2d 31, 39–44, 99 P.2d 623, 626–29 (1940)).
121. Id.
122. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 692, 743 P.2d 793, 799–
800 (1987) (stating that the rule of strict construction of municipal powers does not apply to “mode
or means” of carrying out those powers (citing 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 239 (5th ed. 1911))).
123. Id. at 685–86, 743 P.2d at 796.
124. Heinsma, 144 Wash. 2d at 561, 29 P.3d at 712.
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008) (explaining that “[t]his chapter shall be liberally
construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote” public policy favoring broad access to
public records).
126. See infra Part IV.C.
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have discretion in adopting procedural rules under the PRA,127 one
division of the Court of Appeals of Washington, faced with peculiar
facts in difficult cases, has applied the PRA’s requirement that its
exemptions be construed narrowly to the procedural domain.128
A.

Washington Courts Interpret the PRA Broadly to Promote
Disclosure

Washington courts have characterized the PRA as “a strongly worded
mandate for broad disclosure of public records.”129 Consistent with the
Legislature’s intent that courts interpret the Act’s disclosure provisions
broadly and its exemptions narrowly,130 the courts generally construe the
PRA to promote full access to public records.131 Courts avoid
interpreting the PRA in a way that would tend to frustrate that
purpose.132
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe133 is one of the Supreme Court of
Washington’s earliest expressions on the judiciary’s role in interpreting
and applying the PRA. In Hearst Corp., the Court introduced the oftcited “strongly worded mandate” language.134 The Seattle Post127. See infra Part IV.B.
128. See infra Part IV.C.
129. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978).
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008). The Legislature added this liberal-interpretation
language in 1992 as part of a package of amendments to what is now the PRA. Act of Mar. 31,
1992, ch. 139, § 2, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 559, 564. The legislative history of the 1992
amendments discloses the Legislature’s intent to strengthen the record-disclosure provisions and to
limit the interpretation of the record exemptions; however, the history says nothing about
interpreting procedural rules. See WASHINGTON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBSTITUTE HOUSE
BILL REPORT, H.R. 52-2876, 1992 Reg. Sess., at 2–4 (Feb. 7, 1992).
131. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 734, 745–46,
958 P.2d 260, 265 (1998).
132. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 127, 580 P.2d at 249.
133. 90 Wash. 2d 123, 580 P.2d 246 (1978).
134. Id. at 128, 580 P.2d at 249. The Court would go on to cite the same “strongly worded
mandate” language in numerous cases over the next several decades. See Spokane Police Guild v.
Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wash. 2d 30, 33, 769 P.2d 283, 284 (1989); Progressive
Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 114 Wash. 2d 677, 682, 790 P.2d 604, 606 (1990);
Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash. 2d 782, 788, 845 P.2d 995, 999 (1993); Progressive Animal Welfare
Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994); Servais v. Port of
Bellingham, 127 Wash. 2d 820, 826, 904 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1995); Amren v. City of Kalama, 131
Wash. 2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d 389, 392 (1997); Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 570, 947
P.2d 712, 714 (1997); Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d
734, 745, 958 P.2d 260, 265 (1998); Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 603, 963 P.2d 869,
873 (1998); Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 711, 31 P.3d 628, 637 (2001); Prison
Legal News, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 154 Wash. 2d 628, 635, 115 P.3d 316, 319 (2005); Spokane
Research & Def. Fund v. City of Spokane, 155 Wash. 2d 89, 100, 117 P.3d 1117, 1123 (2005);
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Intelligencer had filed a public-records request as part of an investigation
into whether the King County Assessor had given “special favors” to his
political supporters.135 The Court held that the courts have the power to
determine which records are subject to disclosure and when exemptions
apply.136 The Court did not directly address procedural discretion. Since
Hearst Corp., courts have construed claims of exemption against
agencies and in favor of disclosure.137 But Hearst Corp. and most of its
progeny deal with substantive denials under the PRA; the Hearst Corp.
opinion does not explicitly address the extent to which courts can or
should defer to an agency’s PRA-implementing procedural regulations
and ordinances.138
B.

Although It Has Not Squarely Addressed the Issue, the Supreme
Court of Washington Has Suggested that Agencies Have Discretion
in Establishing Public-Records Procedures

In its Hearst Corp. opinion, the Supreme Court of Washington stated
in dicta that “[a]gencies are afforded some discretion concerning the
procedures whereby agency information is made available.”139 In
subsequent cases, the Court has further defined the extent to which
agencies should have discretion in adopting procedural rules to protect
records from destruction and to prevent public-records requests from
interfering with other essential functions of the agency.140
The PRA requires that such procedural rules be reasonable,141 and
recently several court of appeals decisions have examined agency rules
Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wash. 2d 173, 180, 142 P.3d 162, 168 (2006); Soter v. Cowles
Pub. Co., 162 Wash. 2d 716, 730, 174 P.3d 60, 68 (2007); Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue
Sch. Dist., 164 Wash. 2d 199, 209, 189 P.3d 139, 144 (2008); Yousoufian v. Office of Sims, 165
Wash. 2d 439, 457, 200 P.3d 232, 239 (2009), modified on reconsideration, 168 Wash. 2d 444, 229
P.3d 735 (2010); Rental Hous. Ass’n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 165 Wash. 2d 525,
527, 199 P.3d 393, 394 (2009); City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 355, 217 P.3d
1172, 1179 (2009).
135. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 126, 580 P.2d at 248.
136. Id. at 130, 580 P.2d at 250.
137. See Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008); Yousoufian v.
Office of Sims, 152 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 98 P.3d 463, 467 (2004); Confederated Tribes of the
Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 734, 735–36, 958 P.2d 260, 265 (1998); Progressive
Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994).
138. See infra Part IV.B.
139. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 129, 580 P.2d at 250.
140. See, e.g., Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d at 57, 186 P.3d at 1060 (holding that the
Department of Corrections had the power to adopt a mail policy incidentally limiting inmate access
to public records delivered by mail).
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.100 (2008).
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and regulations under that standard.142 These cases adopt varying
approaches, but no court considering the issue has addressed the
threshold matter of whether courts should defer to agencies’
implementation of PRA procedural rules and, if so, how much. Instead,
some courts have applied, without discussion, the same standard of
review to procedural questions that they have applied in cases of
substantive denials.
C.

The Court of Appeals Has Applied Varying Standards of Review to
Questions of Procedural Rules Implemented Under the PRA

In Zink v. City of Mesa,143 a city councilwoman (formerly mayor) of
Mesa, Washington, and her husband filed about 170 public-disclosure
requests with the city between July 2002 and January 2005.144 Many of
these requests related to a building-permit dispute with the city.145 The
councilwoman described herself as a “watchdog type,” and when the
city resisted her requests, she argued that the resistance was due to
resentment of her watchdog activities.146 At a judicial-review hearing
under the PRA, the trial court heard live testimony from the city clerk
that the councilwoman told her “‘you better do this,’ ‘look this up,’ and
‘if you don’t do this just right, I’m gonna sue ya.’”147
The clerk’s office limited the councilwoman’s access to public
records to one hour per day because complying with her voluminous
PRA requests was interfering with the office’s other responsibilities.148
Despite that limitation, the trial court found that the city “more than
substantially complied” with the requests.149 The court was not
persuaded by the councilwoman’s claim that the clerk would have acted
more expeditiously for someone else.150 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the clerk’s limitation violated the PRA.151 The court cited
Hearst Corp. for the proposition that “substantial compliance” with the
PRA is insufficient and that administrative inconvenience cannot excuse

142. See infra Part IV.C.
143. 140 Wash. App. 328, 166 P.3d 738 (2007).
144. Id. at 333, 166 P.3d at 740.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 333–334, 166 P.3d at 740.
147. Id. at 343, 166 P.3d at 745.
148. Id. at 339, 166 P.3d at 744.
149. Id. at 335, 166 P.3d at 741.
150. Id. at 341–42, 166 P.3d at 744.
151. Id. at 341, 166 P.3d at 744.
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a lack of strict compliance,152 even though Hearst Corp. stated that
administrative efficiency was relevant to PRA procedural
considerations.153 The Zink court also held that the PRA requires that
offices remain open for inspection of records during certain hours of the
day and that the agency cannot shorten those hours.154
In Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of
Spokane,155 an alliance of concerned residents discovered an office
seating chart containing the first names of two persons whom the
county’s planning department had not yet hired.156 Suspecting that the
county was engaging in illegal hiring practices, the alliance filed a
public-disclosure request for all draft seating charts for the department in
question.157 The county provided the draft seating charts as requested.158
The alliance then requested the names of the employees in question and
the file-creation date of one of the draft seating charts.159 The county
provided the requested information—including the file-creation date,
which was later than the date on the chart itself.160 As it turned out, the
employee’s computer on which the seating chart had been created had
been replaced with a newer computer, and the old computer’s hard drive
had been wiped.161
The alliance filed suit, seeking to compel disclosure of the original
seating chart.162 The county successfully moved for summary judgment,
arguing that it had provided the requested file-creation date.163 The court
of appeals reversed, holding that the county’s search procedure was not
sufficiently detailed to produce records that would respond to the
alliance’s request and that the procedure was therefore inadequate for
PRA purposes.164 In reaching this conclusion, the court principally relied
152. Id. at 338, 166 P.3d at 743 (citing Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 140, 580 P.2d
246, 255 (1978)).
153. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 131–32, 580 P.2d at 252.
154. Zink, 140 Wash. App. at 341, 166 P.3d at 744 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.090 (2008)
(requiring that public records be available for inspection during the customary office hours of the
agency; before 1995, these hours were at least 9 a.m. to 12 p.m. and 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.)).
155. 153 Wash. App. 241, 224 P.3d 775 (2009).
156. Id. at 246–47, 224 P.3d at 778.
157. Id. at 247, 224 P.3d at 778.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 248, 224 P.3d at 778–79.
160. Id. at 249, 224 P.3d at 779.
161. Id. at 249–51, 224 P.3d at 779–80.
162. Id. at 251, 224 P.3d at 780.
163. Id. at 252, 224 P.3d at 780.
164. Id. at 265, 224 P.3d at 787.
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upon cases analyzing the Freedom of Information Act, the federal
analogue of Washington’s PRA.165
In contrast to its decisions in Zink and Neighborhood Alliance, the
Court of Appeals of Washington deferred to agency procedural rules in
Parmelee v. Clarke.166 In Parmelee, a prison inmate sued the
Department of Corrections for failing to respond to his public-disclosure
requests.167 The inmate had submitted his requests to a grievance
coordinator at the prison, and the coordinator had responded with
instructions on how and to whom to submit public-records requests.168
The inmate did not follow the established procedure, but instead filed
suit to compel disclosure; he also sought statutory penalties.169 The
Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment, which the
trial judge granted after finding that the inmate had been informed of the
department’s procedures yet had not followed them.170 The court of
appeals held that the department should not be penalized when an inmate
fails to follow internal procedures that are publicly available even if they
are not promulgated as part of the Washington Administrative Code.171
The Zink, Neighborhood Alliance, and Parmelee courts each
evaluated the validity of agency rules and policies in response to their
duties under the PRA. The Parmelee court did not consider the validity
of the agency’s procedural rules; instead, it presumed validity without
explicitly saying so. The Neighborhood Alliance court reasoned by
analogy to federal practice without directly considering how much
deference to afford an agency’s own procedural rules. The Zink court
simply incorporated the strict-interpretation provisions of the PRA’s
substantive disclosure and exemption requirements into the area of PRA
procedural rules. None of these cases establishes clear guidance for
courts to follow when reviewing procedural rules adopted under the
PRA.

165. Id. at 256, 224 P.3d at 783.
166. 148 Wash. App. 748, 201 P.3d 1022 (2008).
167. Id. at 750–51, 201 P.3d at 1024.
168. Id. at 751, 201 P.3d at 1024.
169. Id. at 752, 201 P.3d at 1024–25.
170. Id. at 753, 201 P.3d at 1025.
171. Id. at 759, 201 P.3d at 1028.
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WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD PRESUME THE
VALIDITY OF AGENCY PROCEDURAL RULES ADOPTED
UNDER THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Given the somewhat confused state of the nascent jurisprudence of
PRA procedural rules, courts should turn to established administrative
and municipal jurisprudence and presume the validity of governmental
rules and regulations. Pragmatic considerations caution against imposing
attorney fees and statutory penalties for non-disclosure where agencies
have adopted reasonable rules consistent with the statutory mandate and
requesters have not followed those rules. The PRA’s text does not
require liberal interpretation of its procedural provisions; only its
substantive provisions are subject to the broad reading that courts have
so far applied. Agency rules are subject to evaluation for reasonableness.
Thus, absent contrary language in the PRA, courts should presume the
regulations’ validity.
A.

The Court of Appeals Has Not Considered the Threshold Question
of Presumptive Validity

In each of the three PRA procedural cases the Court of Appeals of
Washington has considered, the court reached its conclusion without
first determining the appropriate basis for review. In both Zink and
Parmelee, the court of appeals grafted the de novo standard used for
substantive denials onto the enforceability of procedural rules.172
However, the court in Neighborhood Alliance did not consider whether
the agency’s reasonable procedural rules should receive any deference at
all.
When considering the validity of an agency’s PRA procedural rules,
courts should first consider whether and to what extent they should
presume that the agency has acted within its statutory discretion. The
state’s Administrative Procedure Act requires no less respect for the
actions of the coordinate branches of government.173 While courts may
not always conclude that agency rules are “reasonable” for PRA
purposes and may fashion remedies accordingly, their discussion of an
agency rule’s validity should start with a presumption of validity. Thus,

172. See Zink v. City of Mesa, 140 Wash. App. 328, 335–37, 166 P.3d 738, 741–42 (2007)
(announcing that the standard of review is de novo; the court of appeals would review the trial
court’s factual findings for substantial evidence); Parmelee, 148 Wash. App. at 753, 201 P.3d at
1025 (stating that review of challenged agency actions under the PRA is de novo).
173. See supra Part III.C.
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an opponent of an agency rule should bear the burden of demonstrating
that the rule exceeds the scope of the agency’s discretion.
B.

There Is Little Statutory Basis for Imposing Penalties for Denials
Stemming From Reasonable Procedural Rules

The PRA’s judicial-review provision does not address what should
happen when an agency’s procedural rules are not followed. The
provision, read as a whole, focuses on substantive denials as opposed to
procedural denials.174 For example, the judicial-review provision places
upon agencies the burden of proving that an exemption applies.175
Nowhere does the text of the PRA, however, equate a procedural rule
with a substantive exemption.176
Whereas most non-PRA regulations and ordinances may be struck
down if they are arbitrary and capricious, procedural rules adopted under
the PRA are reviewed for reasonableness.177 Additionally, courts review
de novo those agency actions taken or challenged under the PRA’s
substantive provisions, which include the provisions directing agencies
to adopt reasonable rules and regulations.178 Reading the reasonableness
and de novo requirements together, de novo review of an agency’s
procedural regulation should focus on the reasonableness of the
regulation.
Elsewhere, the PRA places the burden of proving an exemption on the
agency.179 Nowhere does the PRA equate an agency’s procedural rule
with a disclosure exemption. Indeed, the PRA gives some presumptive
weight to the enforceability of procedural rules: procedural rules can
174. See supra Part II.C.
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(1) (“The burden of proof shall be on the agency to establish
that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that exempts or
prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or records.”).
176. While the PRA does require that its disclosure provisions be read broadly and its exemptions
narrowly, the text of the PRA treats the procedural provisions separately from the substantive
disclosure provisions, and agencies have no discretion to declare a record exempt. Compare WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.56.100 (2008) (requiring agencies to adopt rules to protect records from damage
and to avoid interference with essential agency functions), with id. § 42.56.550(1) (stating that
agencies have the burden of proving that an exemption applies). See also supra note 130 (no
indication in legislative history of an intent to deprive agencies of procedural discretion in adopting
rules to protect records and prevent interference with agency functions).
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(3) (2008) (“[R]eview of all agency actions taken . . . under
RCW 42.56.030 through RCW 42.56.520 shall be de novo.”). This requirement of de novo review
would therefore include section 100 of this chapter, which requires agencies to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules. Id. § 42.56.100.
179. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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bind requesters only if those rules are published in the Washington
Administrative Code or prominently displayed.180 Logic suggests that
the converse should be true: requesters must follow procedural rules that
are published in the Washington Administrative Code or prominently
displayed, but they may challenge those rules on the basis of
reasonableness.
C.

Presuming Rule Validity Reflects Legislative Intent and Addresses
Pragmatic Concerns

When courts review agency PRA regulations and local ordinances de
novo for reasonableness, they should presume validity as they do with
non-PRA rules. The PRA is silent as to what standard of review should
apply to procedural questions, but the state supreme court has suggested
that they receive greater deference.181 Furthermore, deferring to agencies
on procedural matters is consistent with legislative intent favoring
disclosure. Washington courts review procedural rules to make sure the
rules do not exceed an agency’s statutory authority.182 Therefore, a court
reviewing a PRA procedural rule, even presuming that rule is
reasonable, would still have to consider its reasonableness in light of the
authority-granting statute: the PRA.
One example of this kind of deference is the deference courts exercise
in determining whether an agency has exceeded its statutory mandate.
When courts examine whether agency actions exceed statutory authority,
the inquiry is into an error of law, and review is de novo. Courts,
however, will generally defer to an agency’s view of the law.183 To
reconcile disparate levels of deference, courts have held that de novo
review does not lessen the presumption of validity.184 Thus, de novo
review is compatible with the presumption of validity.

180. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part IV.B.
182. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
183. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113, 116–17
(1982).
184. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 161 Wash.
2d 415, 424, 166 P.3d 1198, 1203 (2007) (stating that Growth Management Act hearings board’s
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo but are entitled to substantial weight with respect to the
board’s interpretation of the statute); City of Seattle v. Wilson, 151 Wash. App. 624, 628–29, 213
P.3d 636, 638 (2009) (stating that question of whether a municipal ordinance defining traffic
infraction which leads to injury or death as misdemeanor assault conflicts with state law is a
question of law subject to de novo review; the ordinance is presumed valid, and the burden of proof
is on the challenger to prove otherwise).
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Pragmatic considerations also favor a deferential standard for
procedural rules. Courts have imposed large monetary judgments which,
while encourage broad disclosure, also burden already limited public
resources and, ultimately, the taxpayers whose interests the PRA is
meant to protect. On remand, the trial court in Zink v. City of Mesa
imposed attorney fees, costs, and statutory penalties totaling $239,000,
nearly a quarter of the city’s annual $1 million in tax revenue, or
approximately $544 for each of the city’s 440 residents.185 Mesa’s
annual operating budget is $340,000, and the city is considering filing
for bankruptcy.186 Other cases have resulted in similar large awards. By
his own estimation, a south King County man has made between
$30,000 and $50,000 (net of attorney fees) suing agencies under the
PRA.187 He is a named party in five separate cases that have reached
appellate courts in Washington.188
Washington courts that have considered procedural questions under
the PRA189 might have reached the same result had they applied a
deferential de novo standard.190 While the court in Parmelee v. Clarke
did not explicitly state that it was presuming the validity of the
Department of Corrections’ procedural rules, it nonetheless reached its
conclusion based on the inmate’s failure to comply with the
department’s rules.191 The court in Neighborhood Alliance did not
examine whether the county had a procedural rule requiring that the old
hard drive be searched in connection with a public-records request. If a
rule governing the internal disposition of public-records requests existed,
however, and that rule did not call for the public-records officer to notify
the computer technicians who possessed the hard drive at the time the
request was made, the court should have evaluated the rule for its

185. Kristi Pihl, Judgment Puts Future of Mesa in Question, TRI-CITY HERALD (Pasco, Wash.),
Dec. 13, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2009/12/13/828480/judgment-putsfuture-of-mesa-in.html.
186. Id.
187. Rob Tucker, Man Takes Records Fight Regionwide, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Apr.
21, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.thenewstribune.com/2008/04/21/340472/federal-way-manhas-won-thousands.html.
188. City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 217 P.3d 1172 (2009); Koenig v. City of
Des Moines, 158 Wash. 2d 173, 142 P.3d 162 (2006); Koenig v. City of Lakewood, No. 37761-6-II,
2009 WL 1864001 (Wash. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (unpublished opinion); Koenig v. Pierce
County, 151 Wash. App. 221, 211 P.3d 423 (2009); West v. Port of Olympia, 146 Wash. App. 108,
192 P.3d 926 (2008).
189. See supra Part IV.C.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 166–171 and accompanying text.
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reasonableness. Finally, the court in Zink based its decision at least in
part on the statutory provision requiring that the city’s offices be open
between certain hours to allow the public to inspect public records and
requiring that the city not discriminate among requesters. Even under the
more deferential standard suggested here, the Zink court may have
reached the same conclusion because the city violated a clear provision
in the PRA.
CONCLUSION
In its 1992 amendments to the Public Records Act, the Legislature
stated that “[t]he people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies that serve them.”192 The PRA is designed to reflect this
relationship between the people and the government they create to serve
them. The presumption favoring disclosure encourages the broad access
to public records and minimizes government secrecy. There is some
danger, however, in subjecting every regulation and rule adopted under
the PRA to the strictest scrutiny. Agencies and members of the public
alike will be increasingly unsure of what they must do to comply with
the Act’s mandate. As a result, and for the sake of consistency with the
rest of administrative and municipal law, courts should presume the
validity of an agency procedural rule unless an adverse requester can
show that the rule is unreasonable.

192. Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 139, § 2, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 559, 564 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008)).

